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3. That the stipulations of the lease were guaranteed by the Steel Corporation (p. 30).
4. That the Steel Corporation agreed to mine
the ore and ship it over the Great Northern Railroad, paying therefor a royalty (p. 30).
5. That it was provided that the Steel Corporation might cancel the lease on January 1st, 1915,
on giving two years' written notice (p. 30).
6. That the Steel Corporation by this transaction desired to prevent this ore either from being
mined and sold to independent producers, or from
being utilized to build up a new and dangerous
competitor in the iron and steel business (p. 30).
7. That the practical effect was to forestall
competition and greatly increase the Corporation's control of the ore resources of the country
(p. 30).
8. That the royalty agreed to be paid was unprecedentedly large, thus showing the extent to
which the Corporation was willing to go to prevent this ore falling into the hands of competitors
(p. 30).
9. That by this acquisition the Corporation
strengthened its dominating position (p. 30).
10. That in 1907 (it not being stated whether
this date refers to the period before or after the
lease), the holdings of the Corporation in Minnesota were approximately 75% of the total ore
deposits of the State (p. 30).
11. That the purpose and effect of said lease
were to shut off competition by preventing the es-
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tablishment of a competitor, to secure an undue
power over the steel business by controlling the
source of supply of ore by taking it out of the
market, and to restrain trade and commerce, and
a monopolization within the meaning of the AntiTrust Act (p. 30).
12. That the lease has been cancelled to take
effect January 1st, 1915, but there is no limitation upon the amount of ore that in the meantime
can be taken out by the Corporation (p. 30).
13. One page 47, clause X, the first paragraph
contains sweeping allegations to the effect that
the several ''constituent'' companies, etc., were
engaged in trade and commerce among the states
and territories of the United States, &c.
The word "constituent," however, refers
solely to the other corporations than the above
named defendants and therefore the allegations
of this paragraph do not apply to the Great
Northern ore interests.
14. The
also refer
the Steel
affect our

allegations at the bottom of page 47
only to the constituent companies of
Corporation and, therefore, . do not
interests.

15. On page 48 it is alleged" That the same is true in respect of the
action of the corporation, of said individual
defendants, and of the several companies
herein named, in the acquisition of the control severally ,o f * * * the iron ores of the
Great Northern interests.''
The words '' the same'' relate to preceding
averment that-

{
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'' an agr ement or combination in r estraint
of trade and commerce among the several
States and with foreign nations within the
meaning of Section 1, and a combination to
monopolize a part of the trade or commerce
amonO' the several State and with for iO'n
nations, within the meaning of Section 2 of
the Anti-Trust Act."
was entered into.
This seems clearly to ref er to the action of the
Corporation and of its constituent companies and
to the acquisition by these companies rather than
the lease by our companies of the Great orthern
iron ore, yet from exce s of caution we denied
that we were parties to any such illegal agreement or monopolization.
16. The last paragraph of Clause X, on page
48, refers entirely to the bu iness of the Steel
Corporation and its controlled companies, and
does not seem to ref er to our interests, but for
greater caution we denied that we were parties
to any such plan or combination as that alluded
to therein.
17. The allegations of Clause XII, paO'e 62, are
very vague and almost certainly do not relate to
our interests, but for greater caution were denied by us.
So much as to what the petition does allege.
We now desire for a moment to emphasizeB.-THE MATTERS WHICH ARE NoT ALLEGED IN
THE PETITION.

1. There is no specific allegation (and as above
shown the general allegations do not cover the
point) that any of the defendants which we rep-
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resent were, previously to the making of the
lease, engaged in interstate commerce or commerce with foreign nations.
2. There is no allegation in the petition to the
effect that prior to the execution of the lease
any •o f the defendants represented by us had
been in competition with the United States Steel
Corporation or with any ,o f its subsidiary companies or interests.
It is not claimed, directly or indirectly, that
we had ever been in the steel manufacturing busi- .
ness, nor it is claimed that the United States Steel
Corporation, or any of its subsidiary companies,
had ever been in the business of selling to others
ores mined from lands owned or controlled by
them.
It is, we think, clear that the entire theory of
the petition is based upon the idea that, not b~cause we competed with the Steel Corporation, or
because they competed with us, but simply because
we might have sold ores from these lands to some
concern who actually competed or potentially
might compete with the Steel Corporation-therefore, any combination between the two interests
by way of lease or otherwise, was contrary to the
Statute.
3. There is no specific allegation in any part
of the petition to the effect that we knowingly or
otherwise intended to enter into a contract in restraint of trade, or to become party to an attempt
to m,onopolize any part of interstate commerce.
It will be noted that the allegations of the second paragraph of Clause X, on pages 47 and 48,
as already suggested refer to the action and intent of the Corporation and the several companies
combined under the first consolidation, their
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officers and agents, and the individual defendants
(this evidently not including the Great Northern
T:rustees), which language is substantially repeated at the top of page 48:
'' the Corporation, of said individual defendants, and of the several companies herein
named, in the acquisition of the control * * *."
In other words, we take it that the pleader in
all of these paragraphs was attempting to set
forth the state of mind of the Steel Corporation,
its constituent and controlled companies and the
individual defendants other than the Great Northern Ore Trustees, and was not directing himself
to the mental attitude or intention of the Great
Northern Trustees, or the companies which they
represented.
4. This view is made more clear by consideration of the allegations of page 30. Thus it is
said:
'' That the Corporation, by this transaction, desired to prevent the ore from being
sold to independent producers, etc.''
There is no suggestion that these defendants
joined in that desire, or knew of any such desire
on the part of the Steel Corporation.
5. A.gain, on page 30, it is alleged that the
practical effect was to forestall competition, etc.
There is, however, no allegation that this was
the necessary and inevitable effect of this lease,
or that these defendants knew that such would be
the e:ffect of this transaction.
6. A.gain, on page 30, there is an allegation that
the size of the royalty showed the extent to which
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the C orporat-ion was willing to go to prevent the
ore from falling into the hands of competitors.
There is, however, no suggestion that we fixed
this alleged large royalty in view of any knowledge
or notice on our part of such an intent on the part
of the Steel Corporation, or intent on our part
to join in any such pfan. Nor is it alleged that
this royalty was unreasonably high.
7. Again, on page 30, there are detailed allegations as to the extent of the holdings of the Corporation of ore lands in Minnesota.
But there is no suggestion that we knew or had
notice of the amount of ore the company controlled.
And in this connection it may be noted that
there is no specific allegation that even this large_
quantity of ore resources was incommensurate
with the size of the Steel Corporation's business,
or that we knew of any such disproportion between its holdings and its requirements.
8. Again, on page 30, it is alleged that the purpose and effect of the lease were to shut off competition by preventing the establishment of a competitor, to secure an undue power over the steel
business, by controlling the source of supply of
ore by taking it out of the market, etc., etc.
We submit that there can be no doubt but that
this allegation referred to the intent of the Steel
Corporation to secure power over the steel business, etc., and that there is no ground for any
such interpretation of this allegation as to make
it involve the claim that we knew what the purpose and effect of this lease were, or that we participated voluntarily and intentionally in the Steel
Corporation's alleged monopolistic plan.
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9. In other words, we submit that in no part
of the petition are there any allegations which
aver
(a) Any conspiracy to which we were knowingly parties ;
(b) Any wrongful combination into which we
voluntarily and knowingly entered; or
( c) Any wron°-ful intent on our part, or knowledge of wrongful intent on the Steel Corporation's
part, in connection with the making of the lease
in question, or relating to the establishment of a
monopoly in any part of interstate commerce of
the country.
So far as we were concerned, we believe that
the petition, if we had seen fit to demur, would
have been construed as setting forth simply a
case of wrongful intent by one of the parties to
the lease, but not participated in or known by
these defendants, the lessors thereunder.
10. In the last place, it will be particularly noted
that there is no claim that the acts of the defendants whom we represent in assembling the properties covered by the Steel Corporation's lease,
or in gaining control over these properties, was
in any sense illegal under the laws of the United
States.
We start, therefore, in the consideration of this
case upon the unchallenged ground that we were
rightfully the owners or controllers of all of the
properties which were afterwards included in the
Steel Corporation's lease.
C.-As TO THE ANSWERS oF THESE DEFENDANTS.

Separate answers were interposed by the West
Missabe Iron Company, Ltd., and seventeen other
Companies, and by the Trustees.
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The substance of these answers is the same, although the language differs in detail.
In general all of the defendants above named
deny not merely every suggestion of wrongdoing
on the part of these defendants, but also, for
greater security and without any actual necessity,
have placed themselves on record as to denying
any possible implication of the vague or general
language used from which an inference of illegal
intent or action upon their part could by any possibility be drawn.
As these various specific and general allega~
tions have already been analyzed, we will not now
discuss them in further detail.
D.-THE EssENTIAL FACTS PROVED BY THE GovERNMENT,-AND THE IMPORTANT FACTS NOT PROVEN
BY THEM,-RELATIVE TO THIS BRANCH OF THE CASE.

In view of the immense mass of material contained in the many volumes of the record, it is
almost impossible-and we believe unnecessary
-to attempt to ·group in this brief each and every
item of testimony which relates to the ore situation generally or to the particular lease in question; and we believe a brief review of vital points
which have been brought out-and even more especially those which have not been brought out
by the Government-will be adequate.
First let us review the principal matters which
we would naturally expect to find demonstrated in
the course of an attack of this nature upon the
Great Northern lease, but which as a matter of
fact have not been proven. We observe1. No effeci has been made to show in the proof
that any of the defendants whom we represent
were engaged in interstate commerce prior to the
making of the lease.
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2. There is no proof that any of these defendants had at any time prior to the making of the
lease been in competition with the United States
Steel Corporation, or any of its subsidiary corporations. On the contrary the Corporation was
a buyer and not a seller of ores (p. 3082).
3. There is no direct evidence whatsoeverand, as we shall hereafter show, no indirect €Vidence of any importance-:--showing that
the lease in question was made pursuant to any
intent on the part of the defendants whom we
represent to violate the law, or that any of said
defendants had knowledge or notice of any such
,s uppo ed intent on the part of the lessee, or the
United States Steel Corporation.
4. Not a word of proof has been presented as
to what took place during the negotiations leading up to the execution of the lease.
Reference is made in the Government's brief to
certain extracts from the minutes of the Executive
Committee of the United States Steel Corporation; but we take it that these extracts have no
probative force against us, and that, in any event,
they amount to nothing except to indicate that the
general question of acquiring these lands had
been for some years in the minds of the officers
of the Steel Corporation and that an evident misunderstanding existed at the time of this meeting
with regard to the situation, as shown by the declaration of the President quoted at the top of
page 73 of the Government's brief that '' there is
some misunderstanding.''
5. There is no direct proof-and, we believe,
no indirect proof of importance-to the effect that
any of the defendants whom we represent knew,
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at the time of the execution of the lease, the extent of the Steel Corporation's holdings of ore
lands.
It may, of course, be assumed-although there
is no evidence upon this point-that our people
knew that the Steel Corporation did hold or control, directly or indirectly, substantial areas of
ore lands prior to the making of this lease; but
there is not a word in the testimony indicating
that we knew ":hether that area was ten per cent.
or fifty per cent. or any definite percentage whatsoever, or that we were informed as to the nature
and quality of the ore contained in these acreages.
6. Although the government showed other
leases made at various times upon a lower royalty than ours, yet they wholly failed to offer evidence to the effect that our royalty was unreasonably high in view of the value of the ores leased
and privileges granted.
Let us now review the principal facts which
were proven by the Government. These are:
1. That the Great Western Mining Company
was and is a Minnesota corporation.
2. Of the eighteen companies which we repr1::sent, known as the lessor companies, thirteen
were and are, likewise, organized under the laws
of Minnesota, and five under the laws of Michigan.
3. That these companies owned or controlled
by leases a substantial quantity of ore lands lying
entirely within the State of Minnesota.
4. That under date· of January 2nd, 1907, the
lessor companies executed a lease to the Great
Western Mining Company of the lands in question, and that the Trustees joined in the said in-
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strument, not, however, as lessors, but for other
purposes.
It must be noticed, however, that the lease, although dated January 2nd, 1907, was never actually executed until August, 1907, as appears from
its acknowledgments (p. 12100).
5. That the lands covered by this lease were approximately 39,295.88 acres in area (p. 12095).
6. That the total tonnage of developed ore supposed by us at or about the date · of the lease to
exist in the lands covered thereby was approximately 159,131,000 tons (G. E. IX, p. 2325).
According to the estimate of the Minnesota Tax
Commission, five years afterwards, in May, 1912,
the amount of ore existing on these lands was
fixed at 254,314,430 tons (p. 12067).
The division of these lands between fee lands
jointly owned lands and leased lands is set forth
on page 12096.
7. The term of the lease as to lands owned in
fee was to continue until all merchantable iron
ore grading forty-nine per cent. and upwards in
units of metallic iron, should have been mined and
transported therefrom.
As to leased lands, the term of the lease was to
extend throughout the terms of the underlying
leases, less three months (p. 12096).
8. The lessee is granted the privilege of exploring, mining, shipping and removing all merchantable iron ore from each parcel leased to it (p.
12096).
In other words, the absolute right was granted
to the lessee to select · such parcels as it might
deem richest in high grade ores and located most
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favorably for the purposes of the business, an<l
to operate these parcels as it might see fit, the
only limitation being that certain minimum tonnages must be taken out-or in any event paid
for-during the respective years of the contract
(p. 12097).
The lessee had the right, as stated by the Government's witness, Nelson, to "go after the
cream" (p. 3299).
The value of such a lease, covering such an
acreage of land composed of different parcels adversely located, and of varying mineral values,
and of such a privilege or option of selection as
that afforded by the terms of the lease, will be
hereinafter commented upon.
9. The lessee was granted an option to mme
ores of a lower grade than the forty-nine per
cent. above specified (p. 12096).
10. All ores mined by the lessee were to be
loaded on board cars furnished by the Great
Northern Railway Company, the lessors agreeing to cause the Railway Company to haul such
ore to the docks on Lake Superior (p. 12098).
11. A sliding scale of prices was established,
to be paid by the lessee in the various years of
the lease, covering royalties and freight and delivery charges, and based upon the percentage of
metallic units in the ore. These royalties are set
forth on pages 12098-9 of the record.
In this connection it may be observed that in~smuch as at the time of the lease the freight rate
was eighty cents per ton, it follows that the royalty
per ton of ore containing 59% of iron for the year
1907, the first year of the lease, was 85c per ton,
being the difference between $1.65 gross, and the
freight charge of 80c.
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12. Numerous other details of the lease are set
forth on pages 12096-99 of the record.
13. In article XVII an option was granted to
the lessee to surrender the lease on January 1st,
1915, upon two years previous notice in writing.
This option was actually exercised by the lessee
prior to the filing of the petition in this case.
In this connection it may be noted that after
the exercise of the option certain further agreements were entered into between the parties which
resulted in the surrender to the lessors, on or
about the first day of March, 1912, of all of the
lands covered by the lease with the exception of
2.23 per cent. thereof (p. 12067).
14. Subsequent to the release of these lands, the
lessors resumed possession of them and made
extensive developments thereupon, the general
nature of which is set forth on pages 12101-2-3 of
the record.
15. With regard to the nature of the ore bodies
covered by the lands leased, it must also be noted
before leaving this point, that certain of them
were situated in close proximity to other ore
bodies already owned or controlled by the United
States Steel Corporation (p. 12100) ; and that
certain of those bodies were so located that the
stripping of the overburden from the same could
be easily and economically accomplished and the
mines operated at low cost (p. 12100).
These facts lend additional emphasis to the
value of the option given by the lease to the Steel
Corporation to select and develop such of the ore
deposits contained in the leased lands as might
be most favorably located and richest in mineral
units.
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16. The Government also introduced evidence
to the effect that the royalties reserved under the
lease in question. were higher than royalties paid
under other leases executed at various dates, it
being testifie<l by some of their witnesses that the
:figure of fifty cents per ton represented the prevailing rate of roya~ty in other leases at the time
of this transaction.
The testimony which we ha:rre produced and our
cross-examination of their witnesses flatly contradicts any conclusions which the government
seeks to draw from this testimony.
17. The Government also claims to have proven
that at or about the time of the making of the
lease in question the Steel Corporation controlled
about sixty-four per cent. of all of the ore of the
Mesabi Range, and that our interests controlled
over eight per cent. thereof (Government's Brief,
pp. 68-69).
Without now discussing those :figures, we call
attention to the fact that there is no evidence
whatever tending to show that we had knowledge
or notice of the extent of the Steel Corporation's
ore control at or prior to the making of the lease.
The Court will find upon analysis of all of the
evidence which the Government bas produced
touching this branch of the case, that the claim of
illegality, so far as this lease and these defendants are concerned, rests almost entirely upon
two points:
First, the fact that a large quantity of ore was
included in this lease, thus being taken from the
general market, and that we were (for some reason certainly not shown by the record) "chargeable" (Government's Brief, p. 71), with notice of
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the extent of the ores theretofore controlled by
the Corporation, and with the nature and probable
effec.t of the making of such a lease under those
circumstances.
Second, the claim that the price reserved by the
lessors was so extraordinarily large as to indicate some ulterior object in the minds of both
parties.
Unless many gaps which exist in the Government's case, so far as these defendants are· concerned, can b~ bridged by inferences and assumptions, the Court will, we think, find that the right
to cancel this lease must be based upon conclusions drawn alone from the two points above men◄
tioned.
We will now ask the Court's attention to the
following argument:

POINT I.
As to the reasons for our opposition
to any decree of cancellation of this
lease.

The Court will probably be struck, in commen~
ing its consideration of this branch of the case, by
the fact that notice of cancellation was given pursuant to the terms .of the lease, which notice becomes effective on January 1st, 1915-that is to
say within about two months from the date of
the argument of this case.
. Why, therefore, it may be said, should the defendants take up the time of the Court by any
opposition to a decree which may not be entered
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until after the lease has expired and which, if
thus delayed, will cause no :financial loss to these
defendants Y
If the question of :finances were the only one
in which we were interested, and if the probabilities were that no decree would be made until the
lease had expired, there would, of course~ be no
answer to this point.
But we most strenuously object to the entry of
any decree whatsoever, whether it would involve
the loss of a large sum of money or no loss whatsoever, which should brand these defendants as
participants in the violation of the Anti-Trust
Law, involving, as it would, the aspersion of a
crime. The position of the gentlemen whose interests are represented by this brief is that :financial considerations possess but minor importance
when compared with such an accusation.

POINT II.
The burden lies upon the governm.ent
to show that this lease, in the language
of the Standard Oil case, was "unreasonably restrictive of com.petitive conditions either, ( 1) from. the nature or
character of the contract or act or (2)
where the surrounding circum.stances
were such
as to give rise to the
inference or presum.ption that (it) had
been entered into
with the
intent to do wrong to the general public."

* * *

* * *

Unless it has succeeded in establishing either
one or the other of the foregoing propositions, no
case has been made against these defendants.
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The effect of the decisions in the Standard Oil
and Tobacco cases, was subsequently summarized
as follows:
' ' Those cases may be taken to have established that only such contracts and combinations are within the act as, by reason of intent or the mherent natwre of the contemplated acts, prejudice the public intere·sts,
ete. ''
Nash v. U. S., 229 U. S., 373.

And, as we shall attempt to show hereafter,
even if the Court should consider that the exist•
ence of this lease was against public policy, yet,
unless we are shown to be chargeable with a wrong
motive in entering into it, it does not follow that
the decree to be entered should direct its cancellation, inasmuch as the interests of the public can be amply protected in other ways to which
we shall hereinafter allude.

POINT III.
The m.ere nature or character of the
lease, taken by itself, is certainly not
such as to show any unreasonable restriction of com.petitive con•itions in
Interstate Com.m.erce.

The following points are to be observed:
1. That the lease is in many respects in the ordinary mining lease form.
2. It does not contain a syllable showing any
illegal intention.
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· Although in some respects it is, of course,
unique, yet in no single clause does it indicate
upon its face any purpose other than the legitimate purpose of (to quote the language of the
Supreme Court in the Standard Oil case) '' reasonably forwarding personal interest.''
3. There is nothing in the extent of the lands
which it covers to make it illegal per se.
Whether the ore contained in these lands was
supposed by us to amount as claimed by the Government, to eight per cent. ( or eighteen per cent.)
of all the ores of the Mesabi Range, we take it that
it needs no argument to show that this fact alone
does not invalidate it.
There is now no room for doubt under the recent decisions
the Supreme Court, that the
mere size of an operation taken by itself does
not necessarily involve inherent illegality.

of

U. 8. v. Winslow, 227 U. S., 202, 217.
U. S. v. Americam Tobacco Co., 221 U. S.,
157.
Of course, this point is entitled to be considered
under the second division established by the Standard Oil case, to wit, the class of cases which depend upon '' the surrounding circumstances''; but
taken by itself, it affords no basis whatever for a
decree in favor of the. Government's claim.
4. The price reserved by the lessee, taken by
itself, wholly fails to establish illegality.
Whether the lessor:s received one cent per fon
or one hundred dollars per ton cannot concern
the Government of the United States.
In other words, the question of price as well as
the question of size, while a circumstance which
is entitled to consideration under the second
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branch of the classification above quoted, does not,
by itself, in any degree taint the transaction.
5. We may summarize the nature of the lease,
taken by itself, as being a contract relative to certain lands situated in a certain State, executed
by corporations a majority of which were organized within that State to a corporation organized
in the same State, there being no evidence whatever that any of these corporations had formerly
been engaged in oompetition with each other or
that any of the lessor corporations had formerly
been engaged in interstate commerce.
The absence of competition is shown by the
fact that the Steel Corporation instead of having
been a seller of ore in opposition to us, has wntil
recently been a bwyer and not a seller (p. 3082).
There is manifestly nothing in the "nature or
character'' of such a transaction, considered by
itself alone as to be '' unreasonably restrictive of
competitive conditions" in interstate commerce.
If the situation presented were one of an agreement between two parties which upon its face
provided for the raising of prices of articles used
in interstate commerce, or for an illegal pool, it
would be, from its very nature, directly contrary
to the spirit and letter of the act, and no claim by
either party to such an agreement that he had
acted in all purity and honesty of purpose would
avail.
But in the present case we find no such element
nor any other element which directly, necessarily
and inherently, by itself, violates the Statute.
6. Lastly, in this connection, it is to be noted
that this lease was not a part of the original general combination.
The United States Steel Corporation was organized on February 25th, 1901.
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The lease in question was not actually executed
until August, 1907 (p. 12100).
So far as the defendants whom we represent
are concerned, the lease was a separate and independent transaction, made with an established
and going concern, and not subject to any claim
of participation or taint derived from any illegality in the original combination or to any inherent
vice. Such an act, unless extrinsic evidence of
illegal intent be adduced, cannot be successfully
assailed.
'' Where acts are not sufficient in themselves
to produce a result which the law seeks to
prevent ,;(, * an intent to bring· it to pass is
necessary.''
S wift v. U. S., 196 U. S., 396;
U. S. v. Reading Co., 226 U. S., 357.

~OINT IV.
The Governm.ent has failed to prove
any surrounding circum.stances such as
to justify the conclusion that this lease
was not entered into with the legitim.ate
purpose of reasonably forwarding personal interest and developing trade, or
to give rise to any inference or presum.ption that it was entered into with the
intent to do wrong to the general public
or lim.it the right of individuals.

( See language of Standard Oil opinion,
p. 58.)
In considering whether the Government has
made a case falling within the second sub-division
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above quoted, we ask the Court's attention to the
following points:
A. THE RECORD CoNTAINs ABSOLUTELY No DrRECT EVIDENCE OF ANY ILLEGAL INTENT UPON OuR
PART.
With the exception of the fact that the matter
seems to have been under consideration for several years prior to the making of the lease, there
is practically nothing in the evidence which has
been taken relating in any way to the negotiations
which led up to the final execution of the instrument.
The Government has not produced a single witness who has a word to say as to our mental attitude toward the proposition, and has not even
called any witnesses who attempt to impute actual
illegality of intention to the officers of the Steel
Corporation itself. On the contrary, even so far
as these last named gentlemen are concerned, Mr.
Corey, the only witness of whom the Government
asked any such question, stated that he had no
recollection of hearing any statement made by
any officer of the corporation or any member of
the Finance Committee to the effect that the object of the lease was to take the ore away from
competitors (pp. 3011-12).
And, on the contrary, it is submitted that the
evidence showing that this matter had been under negotiation for some years, is strongly persuasive to the effect that the parties, instead of
being engaged in any mutual conspiracy for their
joint advantage, were, on the contrary, dealing
with the utmost strictness and rigor, at arms
length, contesting in the most strenuous manner,
as is the case in every bona fide business transac-
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But, other than the bare statement which we
have quoted, we do not find a word in the proof
or in the record upon this point.
Of course, we were chargeable with notice of
the fact that if we leased to any lessee the amount
of ore which we controlled or owned, we could
not lease it again to any other lessee or dispose of
it in any other manner. Every sane individual
knows that he cannot have his cake and eat it too.
But there is no claim that we were not at the
time the lease was made the due and lawful owners
or controllers of all of the lands included within
its scope; and this being true, it will be difficult
to sustain the proposition that we did not have
the right to utilize and develop those lands and
their contents in any manner which might seem
to us proper, whether by mining and developing,
leasing to others, or selling-always provided
that we did not intentionally and knowingly join
in some conspiracy or transaction against the policy of the law.
And we take it that in leasing these lands to
the Steel Corporation instead of to some other
lessee, we committed no wrong unless it be shown
that we had knowledge or notice of such facts as
to make a reasonable man believe that the consequences of such a lease would be an unreasonable restraint of interstate commerce within the
meaning of the Standard Oil decision.
But the record does not prove that we had
knowledge or notice of any such facts vn connection with the ore swp,p ly of the Steel Corporation.
The Government says that we are ''chargeable
with the nature and probable effect of turning
over this vast quantity of ore to the Corporation
which already controlled a majority,'' etc. But
the Court will search in vain in the record for
any evidence even tending to show that we had
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any knowledge or notice of the extent to which the
Steel Corporation at that time controlled these
ores.
Undoubtedly, as we have already said, we knew
that they had large ore interests; but there is not
a word in the testimony tending to show that we
had had any information whatsoever as to whether
the Steel Corporation controlled a majority of the
ore deposits of this region, or twenty-five per cent.
thereof, or any other specific percentage. ·
An illegal intent is not to be assumed.
Cincinnati Packet Co. v. Bary, 200 U. S.,
179.
But in this case, unless assumption be resorted
to, the Government's claim upon this point wholly
fails.
We submit that this point is a vital one, for
if, for example, we had supposed, in good faith, at
the time we made this lease that the Steel Corporation had no other ore at that time under its
control, would it for a moment be claimed, under
the facts here disclosed, that the size of the interests leased fainted the transaction with illegality¥
If it be assumed that we supposed, in good faith,
that the Corporation at that time had but ten per
cent. of the available ore under its control, would
it not be difficult to assume any illegality on our
part in adding eight, or eighteen, per cent.
thereto¥
Is it not true that it was the duty of the Government, if it desired to rely upon any such point,
to show affirmatively that at the time of the making of this lease we knew or were charged with
notice that the lessee already controlled such a
large proportion of the total available supply that
the addition of the leased amount would give it
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an unreasonable domination over the ore situation?
We believe that this is the correct proposition
and we respectfully submit that the Government
has wholly failed to establish any facts suffi.,.
cient to enable it to rely upon such an argument.
And to a void any misconception, we desire to
again call attention to the fact that whatever testimony there may be in the record as to what the
actual holdings of the Steel Corporation are or
were at the time, such testimony, without proof of
knowledge or notice on our part, is wholly unavailable as against ourselves.
We were not in the secrets of the Steel Corpora. tion. We were trading with them, not as participants in any joint scheme, but as antagonists.
We had no access to their secrets. We had made
no examination of their lands. There is no proof
that we had searched the records of the various
counties of the State where their leases or deeds
had been recorded. We were not bound to do so.
And even if we had, how could we have ascertained
the tonnage or value of the ore their lands contained. There is no proof that we had notice, or
no reason that we were bound to take notice, of the
estimates or compilations of the State authorities
upon such a topic. Nor had the compilations of
the Minnesota Tax Commission upon which the
Government relies been made at the time of this
lease, the first publication taking place in 1908
(p. 3240).
Again, if it had been shown that we knew that
the ore which we controlled added to what the
dorporation already had in the same Range,
would give them dominion over seventy-five per
cent. of the total known ore bodies in that particular district, would these facts have imputed
any unlawful intent to us 1
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Is it not true that a Corporation like the Steel
Corporation may acquire ore reserves which are
commensurate with its great business T
Is it not true that a mere preponderating influence in one particular district is not fatal, provided that other districts exist?
It has been demonstrated in the present record
that billions of tons of available ores, in some respects better than the Mesabi ore, exist and existed in other quarters of the globe, unless the vast
amount of evidence taken by the Steel Corporation upon this point is wholly unworthy of credit.
This evidence has been summarized in the Steel
Corporation's brief, and we do not need to repeat that summary here. It shows clearly, we
think, that whatever percentage of the Mesabi
ore the tonnage covered by our lease amounted to,
even if the Steel Corporation at the time controlled sixty-four per cent. of that ore in addition thereto, the amount of ore included in our
lease is but a small percentage of all of the available merchantable ore which is and was at the
time available to concerns engaged or desiring to
become engaged in the iron and steel industry in
the United States of America.
C.-No EVIDENCE oF ANY UNLAWFUL PURPOSE ON
OUR PART OR ON THE PART OF THE STEEL CORPORA~
TION IS AFFORDED BY THE EXTRA.CT FROM THE MIN UTES OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE QUOTED

ON

PAGES 71-73 OF THE GOVERNMENT' s BRIEF.
In making this quotation and the claim that is
set forth on page 71 of this Brief, the Government
indicates a realization of the weakness of its position on this branch of the case.
This quotation from the minutes is made to
show that
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'' the Corporation and the Hill interests had
some arrangement or understanding whereby the Hill interests are to withhold from the
general market the ore acquired by them in
return for traffic contracts,',. et.c.
As a matter of fact, the extract m question
shows nothing of the sort.
On the contrary it affirmatively shows that no
arrangement had been made with Mr. Hill. Thus
the President .s tated;
"Mr. Hill is the serious situation up
there, and they are taking these properties
and then in turn le.asing them to our com.
petitors; he is using all his •e fforts to have
them take up these properties. I believe we
must make some arrangement with Hill, H
etc.
This quotation, instead of showing an existing
arrangement for the benefit of the Corporation,
shows exactly the contrary.
Instead of showing a deal already made, it
shows a desire to make a deal in the future.
In no event is it of any probative force against
us ; but even if so, it proves exactly the contrary
of what the Government claims. Even if the
Corporation had assumed a friendly attitude on
the part of Mr. Hill, yet the last words of the
quotation clearly shows that at the time of this
meeting they recognized '' there is some misunderstanding" (p. 73).
D.-No

INFERENCE OF UNLAWFUL INTENT CAN BE

DRAWN FROM THE PRICES RESERVED TO THE LESSORS
BY THE TERMS OF THE LEASE .

.With regard to this branch of the case, the following points are to be noted:
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1. The averment of the petition is that
'' the royalty agreed to be paid us wnprecedentedly large, thus showing the extent io
which the Corporation would go to prevent
this ore falling into the hands of competitors.''
There is no allegation, however, that the royalty
was wnreasonably large.
Manifestly, whatever the precedents may have
been, unless the Government alleges and proves
that in this particular transaction such an unreasonable figure was reserved as to indicate some
ulterior purpose, the point amounts to nothing.

2. The testimony as to the prices obtainable in
the early years of the present century, is wholly
irrelevant and may be entirely disregarded.
The Court will find in various parts of the record reference to the fact that twenty-five cents
per ton, and in some cases less, was paid as royalties upon lands leased in 1900-1-2, etc.
We shall not occupy time in discussing the details of these leases for, manifestly, such testimony has no bearing whatever upon the claim
that the price reserved in this particular lease,
made in 1907, was ''unprecedented'' in the sense
of being unreasonable.
It is only necessary at this point to refer to
the fact that both Mr. Corey and Mr. Nelson, the
Government's chief witnesses, expressly admitted
that prices had risen materially since the years
above alluded to (pp. 3091, 3258).
3. The testimony of Messrs. Corey, Thompson,
Jones and Gayley fail to maintain the Government's claim.
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Mr. Corey-a gentleman whose personal attitude toward the Steel Corporation will be seen
upon examination of his evidence to admit of but
little doubt-swore that fifty cents per ton was the
outside royalty which ought to have been paid
upon this lease. He stated that he based his opinion upon the prices at which leases had been made
up to and including the time of the making of the
Hill lease-which lease, as we have shown, was
made in August, 1907.
On cross-examination Mr. Corey does not, we
think, shine with particular brilliancy so far as
this portion of his testimony is concerned.
He stated that his opinion was based upon a
list of leases which had been made up, being
leases which the Steel Corporation was interested
in (pp. 3084-5). Immediately afterwards, however, he was compelled to admit that two leases
had been made to the Oliver Iron Mining Company, one of the Steel Corporation's subsidiaries,
on January 1st, 1907, the month as of which the
Hill lease was dated but eight months before its
actual execution (3091), and although he attempted to evade any statement as to the price,
yet he was forced to admit that, after some questioning, he had no doubt that seventy-five cents
was paid (p. 3092), and, after further questioning·, that he was not _prepared to disagree with the
information that seventy-five cents was paid.
Testimony of this sort, although attempted to be
qualified, coming, as it did, from the former.
President of the Steel Corporation himself upon
his cross-examination, throws much light upon
the value of his opinion.
We also call attention to his cross-examination,
as shown on pages 3099-3105.
It is also to be noted that at the time Mr. Corey
testified he evidently had an extremely vague idea
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of what the Hill lease was and of the terms which
it contained.
Thus, at first he swore that the price was double what it ought to have been. On cross-examination (p. 3067) he was compelled to admit that
he thought that the freight rate was seventy cents
per ton instead of eighty cents per ton, and he
admitted that his first answer had been made
upon that idea.
Later on he admitted that he did not have in
mind the principal terms or conditions of the lease
(p. 3098). And it is certain that at no time was
he considering the lease as an individual, specific
proposition in the light of its own special merits
or demerits as Mr. Nelson, who followed him, admitted should be done. He was assuming it to
be similar to other leases (p. 3097).
His final statement, made after several attempts at evasion, to the effect that he did not
recognize any value in the- privilege given by the
Hill lease of selection of the best and most favorably located ore of 250,000,000 tons, good for
eight years, leaves him in a rather difficult position upon its face.
In this connection, it is to be noted that Mr. .
Corey having said that such selection was impossible was speedily compelled to admit that the
Corporation had in fact actually done this impossible thing (pp. 3100-1).
Mr. Thompson's testimony was simply to the
effect that he had never heard of any royalty being paid in the Lake Superior Region as high as
that paid in the Hill lease, up to that time.
His testimony read in connection with the facts
set forth in Mr. Nelson'g cross-examination (pp.
3269-3278) and in the stipulation subsequently

made by the Government's attorneys, merely indicates that his "hearing" was deficient (pp.
12103-6).
Mr. Jones testified that in 1901 the average rate
of royalty was about twenty-five cents a ton.
This is conceded, but has no possible bearino- on
the proper price payable in 1907. Both Mr. Corey
and Mr. Nels on, the Government's chief witnesses
upon this point, admit that prices materially increased subsequent to the dates mentioned ( pp:
3091, ,3258).
Mr. Gayley 's testimony, quoted by the Government, is to the effect that he did not recall any ore
property acquired by the Corporation prior to
January 1st, 1905, at the rate of more than fifty
cents a ton. This statement, it will be noticed,
refers solely to a period over two years prior to
the actual execution of the Hill lease, a period
during which prices were increasing.
4. The testimony of Mr. elson, the Government's chief witne·ss upon this point, instead of
demonstrating the proposition contended for,
affirmatively showed that comparisons of the nature relied upon by the Government were not the
proper ways of ascertaining the rea onableness
of the royalty and demo_nstrated that each lease
mwst be considered by itself and in the light of

its O'Wn circumstances.
The part of Mr. Nelson's testimony upon which
the Government relies was that in the early part
of the century royalties ran between twenty-five
and thirty-five cents, increasing between 19041907 to, he should say, forty or forty-five cents
per ton.
•
But in his direct examination ( p. 3234) he
states, on being asked the value of ore in the
ground during certain years-
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'' It would be a matter that would have to
be considered from individual standpoints.
The property would have to be considered by
itself. Some were g,old at that time, or a
little earlier, for a few cents a ton. You
would have to take into consideration the
stripping cost, mine cost, and the quality of
the ore. Then, I think, besides, it would
make quite a difference who owned the property.''
And below:
"There are conditions that exist with each
individual property that would have to be
considered in making estimates of the value
of the ore'' (p. 3234).
On cross-examination he amplifies his statements by saying that"in trying to fix the value of a given body
of ore it was necessary to study the particular situation of the ore, the physical location of it, the amount of the •Over-burden, the
question as to whether it was wet or dry
country down where the ore lies, the question
of its proximity to a railroad, and in fact
all the other circumstances of the particular
case" (p. 3258).
On being asked what he meant as to the ownership of the ore being an element of its value, he
said:
"Well, for instance, if a man like Mr. Hill
owns a lot of ore, he could command a better
figure for his ore than I could get for mine,
because he is in a position to go ahead and
carry his ore and build blast furnaces and
steel plants, and do everything. I am not;
I have to sell my ore, and sometimes I have
to sell it pretty quick too" (p. 3259).
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He also added that the question of finance was
also material (p. 3259), and that if a man has
enough financial backing he might utilize his ore
beds in one of several different ways, not being
compelled to lease or to sell to somebody else (p.
3259).
After further discussion, the witness brought
out the very important point that:
'' There is really only one way to figure
values of ores, and that is after figuring the
mining costs and the transportation costs by
the unit system; the values of the units of
ore on Lake Erie" (p. 3260).
This proposition he amplifies on pages 32603261 making this point very clear:

''·Q. In other words, the whole thing is very
largely an individual proposition 1 It must
be considered by its elf in any lease of special
importance; is not that sot
A. More or less it depends upon the individual properties, conditions and so forth''
(p. 3261).
On cross-examination as to the leases which he
had in mind in fixing rates at forty or forty-five
cents, it appeared that all of the leases which
he had in mind of this nature were made substantially before the Hill lease was made (pp. 32649).
He then gave a number of instances where
larger figures were obtained than those in the Hill
lease-for instance the Virginia Mining Company
lease, made in 1910, in which the royalty was $1.35
per ton, although the metallic contents did not exceed 57.10 per cent. (p. 3270), nearly two per
cent. lower than the 59 per cent. basis in the Hill
lease.
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It will be ·noted that the royalty in this lease
was fifty cents per ton higher than the 1907
royalty in the Hill lease.
He then mentions the Madeira lease, made in
December, 1909, upon which $1.35 was paid (p.
3272), a 60c lease made in 1907 (p. 3273), a 65c
lease made in 1910 (p. 3274), a Wallace Company
lease made in 1905 at 75c (p. 3275), and a New
York State Steel lease made, apparently, in October, 1906, at $1.25 per ton (p. 3278).
The net result of Mr. Nelson's examination was,
therefore, to demonstrate, in entire opposition to
the Government's theory:
First, that each lease must be considered separately in order to determine the reasonableness
of its royalties;
Second, that the elements entitled to consideration were not only the physical questions and legal
privileges involved, but ~he financial position of
the owner ; and
Third, that the real test of the value of ores
was their value at the ports on Lake Erie after
figuring the mining and transportation costs.
Although Mr. Nelson in his direct-examination
said that he thought the royalty was hig·h, yet at
no place in his testimony does he claim that under
the cirCW>nstances of this p articular lease it was
unreasonably high or so high as to afford any indication of an occult purpose in entering into the
transaction. The effort to obtain such testimony
from him proved futile (p. 3236).
1

In view of this testimony of the Government's
chief witness upon the point as to the proper
methods of ascertaining the value of ores and
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the reasonableness of reserved royalties, it was
clearly the Government's d1uly to produce proof
along the lines indicated by him if it intended to
rely upon any claim of wnreasonable royalty.
Whatever faith the Government may previously
have pinned upon general comparisons of lease
prices and upon opinion testimony by gentlemen
not personally familiar with the details, was irreparably damaged by Mr. Nelson's testimony.
He made it plain that a detailed examination of
t he legal provisions and privileges of the lease, of
the location of the lands, of the nature and quality of the ore, of the amount of overburden to be
removed, of the moisture or dampness of the surrounding soil, of the proximity to a railroad, etc.,
was necessary before an opinion could be given
a s to whether a specific royalty was high or low.
He also showed that the financial position of the
owner of the lands was an element of importance
in this regard.
·
But he did not himself say that he had examined
these lands, and his purported familiarity with
the legal provisions of the Hill lease was shown
to be based upon slight foundations. Nor did he
himself say that the royalties reserv ed in this particular lease were, in his opinion, unreasonably
high.
An,d no other witness was produced by the
Government who was prepared to go over the
ground along the lines indicated by Mr. Nelson to
demonstrate his familiarity with the elements involved, and to pronounce the price as beyond the
bounds of reason.
Moreover, looking at the other line of thought
which Mr. Nelson suggested, the Government did
not furnish any proof as to the valwe of this ore
upon the basi of its sales price at Lake Erie
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ports as compared with the cost of mining and
transportation.
Perhaps we may be pardoned if at this point
we call attention to one fact along the line of such
an investigation which the Government did prove,
to wit, that in the year 1907 the prices of Mesabi
ores at Lake Erie ports were, as ,shown in table
3, page 1618 of the Government's Exhibits, Vol.
V, Part 1, $4.90 per ton for the Mesabi-Bessemer
ore, and $4.10 for Mesabi non-Bessemer ore.
Inasmuch as the rail freight from the mine to
the Lake was 80c. per ton and as the Lake freight
was 60c. per ton, it follow s that the value of the
Mesabi-Bessemer ore at the mine after having
been mined, in the year 1907, was approximately
$3.50 per ton-a price which even upon the most
liberal allowance for average mining costs and
incidental charges, would have been found, we
venture to assert, had this line of testimony been
followed, to have left as the net value of the ore
to the owners thereof, prices much higher than
the 85¢ royalty reserved in the lease for the year
1907, or any of the other royalties which would
have been payable not only up to the end of the
eight year period allowed for the cancellation of
the lease, but for many years thereafter.
Of course, the incompleteness •o f this testimony
compels us to guess somewhat at the real facts;
but the result of the foregoing suggestions may
well account for the failure of the Government to
prosecute this inquiry.

It was not for us to furnish proof along these
lines in support of our denial of any unreasonableness in the royalties reserved. It was for the
Government to affirmatively produce proof maintaining its position-and this was not done.
Hence, we believe we are justified in saying
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that all preceding proof which the Government
had introduced bearing upon the question of the
reasonableness of the rates, was discredited by
Mr. Nelson's testimony, and that nothing to take
its place was thereafter provided.
5. Even upon the basis of comparison of prices
without regard to the special elements of each
lease, the Government '·s case falls.
The cross-examinations of Mr. Corey and Mr.
Nelson, to which we have already alluded, show
a number of leases made at or about the same
time of the lease in question and at prices which,
in several instances, were very much higher than
the royalty reserved in the Hill lease.
The stipulation of counsel, set forth on pages
12103 to 12106 of the record, gives instances (several being additional ones) of the same naturespecific instances as distinguished from the general statements found in the Government's testimony; and several of these specific instances are
prior to or near the date of execution of the Hill
lease.
If this species of proof were deemed controlling, we should rely with confidence upon our evidence as -compared with the Government's.
The attempt of the Government to show that
the Hill lease should date from February, 1906,
is ill-founded. The only effect of the extract
from the Steel Corporation minutes relied upon
is to show a general understanding '' if the parties agree as to details" (G. E., p. 605). No definite conclusion was reached until August, 1907.
Moreover if mere pendency of the negotiation
were material it must be remembered that it began in 1902 ( G. E., p. 573-5), at which time other
leases were made on a 25c basis.
But as above shown, the best evidence as to
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value is found along the lines indicated by Mr.
Nelson-as to which the Government's case is
silent.
6. Applying Mr. Nelson's tests we shall :find

that the lease in question was a unique lease,
containing circumstances which show in a high
degree the existence of the elements relied upon
by Mr. Nelson as constituting value.
It covered a very large acreage and tonnage o~
ore. There is no evidence of any similar lease
ever having been executed in the history of the
ore business.
It gave exceptional privileges in that it permitted the lessee to-as Mr. Nelson said-''take
the cream" of the ores. An absolute right of
selection was afforded out of millions of tons of
ore-thus permitting the lessee to take within the
eight-year period, the best in quality as well as
location, and thus affording every facility for
economy and speed of operation.
Many of these ore bodies were located in close
proximity to other ore bodies already owned or
controlled by the Corporation (pp. 12100-1).
Certain of these ore bodies were Ao located that
the stripping of the overburden from the same
could be easily and economically accomplished and
the mines operated at low cost (p. 12100).
The privilege is granted of concentrating ores
mingled with foreign substances, and of paying
royalty only in respect of and upon the concentrates resulting therefrom (p. 12107). This is
important, as Mr. Nelson says (p. 3228), and is
not shown by the Government to have been included in other leases. It emphasizes the power
to which Mr. Nelson had alluded of taking the
''cream'' instead of the skimmed milk.
The right to terminate the lease at the end of
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eight years was granted to the lessee, thus enabling it to thoroughly investigate the situation,
to take an unlimited quantity of the best and
cheapest ore at the lowest royalties named in the
lease, and then to abandon all further operations
if the results were not satisfactory.
Tlilis privilege was greatly relied upon by Mr.
Gayley in approving the making of the lease, as
. he felt certain that by vigorous mining operations the ore could be exhausted before reaching
far into the higher royalties (pp. 3584-5).
The lands leased were controlled by interests of ample financial power, possessing adequate transportation facilities, who, instead of
being compelled by extrinsic conditions to part
with their ore for anything they could get, wer e
fully able to hold it and develop it in such a way
as to give the largest possible return.
And, in view -o f Mr. Nelson's testimony, if such
a lease as this were made at prices lower than
those actually secu,r ed on other leases of much
smaller properties made at or about the same
time, upon what possible basis can it be validly
claimed by the Government that the prices reserved were so unreasonably high as. to furnish
any indieation of had faith upon the part of the
lessors 7
In leaving this branch of the ease, we respectfully submit to the Court that instead of the reserved royalty furnishing any indication of
wrongful intent on the part of the lessors., exactly the opposite conclusion should be drawn therefrom.
We believe that all of the evidence tends directly to support -o ur contention that the transaction in question was one which was negotiated
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for many years, absolutely at arm's length, entirely upon a business basis and, so far as we
are concerned, solely with a view, to use the language of the Standard OH case, of '' reasonably
forwarding personal interests and developing
trade.''
7. We respectfully submit that the record is
entirely devoid of any '' surrounding circumstances". such as to justify the -conclusion that
the lease in question was entered into ''with the
intent to do wrong to the general public.''

POINTV.
The Great Northern leasct is valid under the doctrine of the Sho~ Machinery
Case.

In United States v. Winslow, 227 U. S., 202, the
Supreme Court held that a combination of different patents not previously competing with each
other, but each relating to machinery used in
different steps of the general process of manufacturing shoes, was valid. The Court said :
'' On the face of it the combination was
simply an effort after greater efficiency. The
business of the several groups that combined, as it existed before the combination,
is assumed to have been legal. * * * As, by
the interpretation of the indictment below,
and by the admission in argument before us,
they did not compete with one another, it is
hard to see why the collective business should
be any worse than "its component parts. * * *
It is as lawful for one corporation to make
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every part of a steam engine and to put the
machine together as it would be for one to
make the boilers and another to make the
wheels.'' 227 U. S., 217-218.
In ,o ther words the court held that where the
making of a completed article involves numerous
successive steps, related to each other as the
variou links in a chain are related, it is lawful
for a concern controlling some of the links to
add other links representing other separate and
non-competing steps in the process.
·w e submit that the Great Northern lease falls
directly within this doctrine for the following
reasons:
1. We wish to again emphasize the fact that no

attack is made in this proceeding against the
legality of our control over the leased lands.
The Government does attack the legality of certain pre-existin°· combinations as the Federal
Steel Company, the American Steel Wire Company, &c., but no suggestion is made as to any
illegality whatever in the acquisition by us of the
various lands subsequently leased.
2. Previous to the lease there had been no
competition between us and the Steel Corporation.
As already pointed out, the latter concern was
a buyer and not a seller of ores-at least up to
a date long after the making of the lease in question.

3. The Steel Corporation was endeavoring to
place itself in a position where it could perform
each and every of the steps leading to the completion of manufactured products. These steps
were:
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First, to acquire iron ore ;
Second, to acquire coal and coke and other raw
materials;
Third, to transport them to its manufacturing
establishments;
Fourth, to make pig iron fr.om these raw materials;
Fifth, to transform this pig iron into rails,
bars, wire or other manufactured products.
Manifestly these various steps are necesarily
successive in their nature and are connected together like the links of the chain which was held
to be legal in the Shoe Machinery case.
4. After its original organization, in which we
had no part, the Corporation desiring Lo
straighten its positions as to the first link in the
chain, came to us and asked us to lease these
lands which we then lawfully controlled.
And, without any illegal intent on our part,
without knowledge or notice of illegal intent on
the Corporation's part, without knowledge or notice of any fact from which an infere nee of any
illegal re,s ult would necessarily be drawn, and on
the contrary, with knowledge that the transaction would not stifle or affect any existing competition between us and the Steel Corporation or
any of its subsidiaries, we accepted their proposition and executed the lease. rhis was not an
interference with competitive conditions, under
the W vnslow doctrine·.
5. If criticism is made upon the size of the ore
deposits which were covered by this lease, let us
test the validity of the criticism by assuming for
the moment that at the time when the Steel Corporation approached us, we lawfully owned and
controlled every ton of ore in the entire Mesabi
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Range-or, if we please, in the entire State of
Minnesota-and that neither the Steel Corpora ·
tion nor any other concern had any interest whatsoever of that nature in that territory.
Keeping in mind the situation already alluded
to, that no attack whatever is suggested as to the
legality of our acquisition of these ore interests,
is it not clear that if we saw fit we might have
leased this entire tonnage comprising all of the
ore resources of the whole State to the Steel Corporation, which desired to add the ore link to
the other links in its chain of manufacturing1
And if such an act upon such a hypothesis
would have been valid, we respectfully submit
that no criticism can be made upon such a lease
covering the small percentage which we actually
did control, unless it either stifled competition between the parties thereto, which was not the case,
or was attended by such surrounding facts and
circumstances as to indicate an illegal intent upon
our part-which alternative as we have already
shown, had no existence in fact.
6. Jt is therefore ,s ubmitted that the doctrine
of the Shoe Machinery case is conclusive upon
this branch of the present proceeding.

POINT VI.
If for any reason i t were considered
that the conti nued exi stence of the l e ase
in the hands of the lessee i s a g ainst public policy, the proper remedy under the
circumstances is not a cancellation of
it, but a segregation.

A Court of Equity has ample p ower to mould
its decree to the necessities of the particular case.
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And this principle is directly applicable to
Anti-Trust suits.
'' So far as is consistent with this purpose
(i. e., the ending of unlawful combinations),
a court of equity, dealing with such combinations, should conserve the property interests inv.olved. ''
U. 8. v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 226 U. S.,
at p. 477.
Applying this principle to the present situation ( on the assumption that for some reason
that we fail to grasp the lease were held to
possess elements of danger to the public), what
should be done f
To cancel the lease would be, in effect, to hold
us guilty of participation in a crime of which
there is absolutely no evidence.
No such cancellation is necessary for the protection of the Government since, in the first place,
the lease will have only two months to run at the
date of the argument and since, in the second
place, even if it had a long unexpired period,
ample protec.tion could be afforded by segregation instead of cancellation.
In other words, we respectfully submit that
in cases of a transaction like this, which was not
a part of any original, general ,c riminal combination, which was entered into in good faith by
innocent parties with a lessee which, on the above
assumption, had been held to be an illegal combination, the lessors should not be treated as beinoin pari delicto with the illegal organization.
The object of the Anti-Trust Law is really to
put into more concrete and efficient shape certain of the original principles of the common law.
Thus it is said in the Standard Oil case:
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"The standard of reason which had been
applied at common law, was intended to be
the measure used.''
See also Thornton, Anti-Trust Act, p. 249.
And at common law clear distinctions have always been drawn, in cases where the parties
were not equally guilty, between the guilty one
on the one hand and the remedies which should
be invoked against him, and the innocent one on
the other.

Bibb v. Allen, 149 U. S., 481.

4

If this principle be applied in the present case,
what would be the result, assuming that the Steel
Corporation were held to be an illegal combination!
Manifestly that Corporation would be dissolved.
Manifestly the lease in question would be apportioned to one of the new organizations resulting from the new diss•o.l ution under such restrietions as to insure ample competition in the future
and an avoidance of all monopoly.
But, manifestly, we take it, there would be no
justice in punishing the innocent lessors by directing a cancellation of the lease, whioh would
involve their being tainted with the aspersion of
a crime, which they have not been shown to have
committed.
It is not our intention at the present time to
discuss what should be done in all conceivable
classes of cases. As we have already indicated,
equity always possesses ample power to mould
its decree to the particular situation involved;
and in this situation, even if the Steel Corporation should be held to be an illegal organization,
even if it should be found that it made this lease
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with an occult and unlawful intent in which we did
not participate, we believe that justice could still
be done while the interests of the innocent lessors
were at the same time protected, by the application as above suggested of the doctrine of the
Union Pacific case (supra).
A contrary result would, we respectfully submit, be fraught with the gravest injustice not only
to the reputations of honorable and innocent
men, but financially, in view of possible claims
for damages by third parties as provided in the
act, and as may be provided by pending legislation now under consideration.

POINT VII.
The bill is m.ultifarious as far as these
defendants are concerned.

This lease was a separate and independent
transaction occurring over six years after the
organization of the Steel Corporation.
· None of the many defendants in -the action,
except the Steel Corporation and the Great
Western Mining Company, and, of course, the
defendants whom we represent, are alleged to
have had anything to do with this transaction.
Nor are the defendants whom we represent
alleged to have had anything to do with the
numerous other transactions oontained within
the scope and purview of the bill.
Under these circumstances, we ,s ubmit, that the
case requires the application of the general rule
to the effect that separate and disconnected
transactions, each involving different parties
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either entirely or in part, cannot be attacked in
the same bill.
See:
Swift v. U. S., 196 U. S., p. 396.
If it were shown that all of \he defendants
were parties to a general conspiracy, the situation would, of course, be different.
But, so far as these defendants are concerned,
we have already demonstrated that such is not
the case. Our transaction stands entirely by itself, involving only ourselves and two others of
the total parties named as defendants. It is not
a part of any general · plan to which we were
parties. It cannot, therefore, be properly attacked
in a bill whose primary· purpose is to set -aside
a combination, consummated betwee:µ different
parties, and six years prior to the ·execution of
the lease.
POINT VIII.
It is respectfully subm.itted that the
petitio~ should be dism.issed as to the
above nam.ed defendants.
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